

CHAL 0245
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18 July 1958

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MEMORANDUM TO: Special Assistant to the Director
for Planning and Development

25X1A SUBJECT : Operations [] Considerations

25X1A 1. It is recommended that Operation [] be postponed indefinitely for reasons listed below.

2. As pertains to both proposals, namely; the original proposal involving five missions and the modified proposal involving two missions, the following considerations are offered:

(a) All USAF major and/or operational commands are on alert status due to the Middle East situation. This involves the movement of troops, supplies, equipment and preparation for a state of maximum readiness. In the event of open and/or local hostilities, the commands (USAFE and NMFS) that perform the major support function for Project CHALICE would be the first to be actively engaged in combat. The alert status of these commands is such that all available resources are committed and needed at the present time.

3. As pertains to the original proposal (five missions):

(a) The recommended plans were the result of:

(1) Discussions and deliberations with OSI []

(2) Discussions and deliberations with []

[]
(3) Informal conversations with SAC Elys reconnaissance personnel and other technical personnel working in the electronic intelligence area.

(4) The reactions of the Ad Hoc Committee members to the recommended proposals which were the result of 3 (a) (1), (2) and (3) above.

(b) The recommended plans were based on the following considerations:

(1) System IV coverage of known and unknown targets in known areas of interest would be obtained.

(2) Coverage of the entire Northern Russian periphery would be obtained providing either negative or positive information of unknown areas.

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(3) The coverage mentioned in 3 (b) (2) above; as pertains to technical analysis and evaluation would be simultaneous.

(4) Ground crews, air crews, HQs personnel, communications support agencies, etc. would receive valuable and realistic training on an effective basis.

(5) The operation would allow for realistic evaluation of mobility and dispersal plans and portions of the evacuation plan.

(6) Significant and important operational information would be obtained by System III.

(c) The significance of the above considerations is as follows:

(1) The quantitative collection capabilities of System IV as pertains to the number of intercepts, the number of signal characteristics recorded, and the on-target time do not duplicate any other effort and if properly used would make the other available capabilities and operations more effective and/or efficient.

(2) The nature of the so called "unknown" is such that little or no emphasis is specifically placed on it on a pre-planned basis. On the other hand, it is the so called "unknown" that causes the most concern at the time it is either suspected, rumored, or put in a category as known, but, cannot be fit into a pattern or evaluated because of the lack of information.

(3) Simultaneous coverage is most important in terms of an accurate evaluation of: "state of the art" of existing in-place capabilities, determining the best entry and exit points and for comparison purposes at a later date in order to determine technological and operational progress.

(4) In addition to the value of exercising the entire system the considerations of maximum effectiveness and economy in the shortest period of time carried considerable weight.

(5) Based on previous operations it was felt that very significant intelligence as pertains to exit and entry points is obtained from System III. Future operations utilizing different pre and post strike bascs and using System III information for planning exit and entry points is highly recommended. Operation [redacted] would provide CHALICE operations staff with the majority of these planning factors for the Arctic area.

(6) The possibilities of a protest [redacted] flight are very high and could only be justified in light of all of the above.

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4. As pertains to the modified proposal (2 missions):


- (a) It is felt that the information obtained would be diluted to such an extent that the modified proposal could not be justified, particularly in view of a protest.
- (b) The significant operational reasons that the Air Force would have for not concurring in the original plan would apply to this plan. It is felt that the dilution mentioned above would strengthen their case.
- (c) Since the USAF has stated that this type of operation is a policy matter, the project should use the strongest justification possible to clarify or settle the question. Execution of the modified plan would weaken Project CHALICE in any negotiations concerning this problem.

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(e) The specific policy matters referred to in the USAF memo, as pertains to the original proposal, are not known. It is felt that submission of the modified plan as a "foot in the door technique" was sound before the Middle East crisis occurred. The current delay has nullified any advantage that the "urgency of time element" may have had.

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